

TOP SECRET



18 February 1965




Copy No. C E & S



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY



GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008100450001-2

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008100450001-2

18 February 1965


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS




25X1

3. Laos: Communists continuing military build-up throughout Laos. (Page 4)
4. USSR: Statement by military leader appears to verify substantial reduction in Soviet armed forces. (Page 5)



25X1

6. Notes: Sudan;  Honduras. (Page 7)


25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008100450001-2

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008100450001-2



Laos: The Communists are continuing to strengthen their military posture throughout Laos.

In a series of recent attacks in northeastern Laos, the Communists have cleared progovernment forces from several key positions between Ban Ban and Sam Neua town along Route 6.

These moves evidently have the objective of eliminating long-standing government pockets within the Pathet Lao "liberated areas." They also could be the first steps toward establishing Route 6 as an alternative to Route 7 for supplying the Plaine des Jarres area from North Vietnam.

In south-central Laos, the Communists are continuing to bring in troops and supplies. Since early this month [according to roadwatch reports] at least 170 trucks and possibly as many as 1,200 North Vietnamese troops ^{reportedly} have moved into Laos along Route 12.

These troops may be moving south to counter recent rightist advances in the area between Pha Lane and Muong Phine on Route 9. [On 14 February, a captured Pathet Lao soldier reported a large concentration of North Vietnamese troops a few miles to the northwest of Muong Phine] [redacted]

25X1

(Map)

25X1
25X1

18 Feb 65

4

USSR: [Apparent verification of a substantial reduction in the Soviet armed forces since 1960 was contained in a 17 February statement by Marshal Sokolovsky]

[He said that the total force strength was now 2,423,000. This figure is identical to the one Khrushchev cited in 1960 as his objective in reducing the armed forces from 3,623,000]

[In part because of international tensions, Khrushchev's program was halted in mid-1961 after the strength had been cut back to about three million men. Faced with strong demographic and economic pressures, Khrushchev raised the issue of reductions again in early 1963 following the Cuban missile crisis]

[If Sokolovsky's figure is accurate, it indicates that there has been a further reduction of almost 600,000. The brunt of the reductions was probably borne by the ground forces]

25X1
25X1

18 Feb 65

5

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008100450001-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008100450001-2

NOTES

Sudan: [The leftist-dominated government has stiffened its resistance to the demands of the non-Communist parties for reconstruction of the cabinet. While the parties still have the upper hand, their position is threatened by the difficulty of maintaining in the Khartoum area large numbers of their out-of-town tribal supporters. If leftist resistance continues, the non-Communist leaders may yet turn to demonstrations and violence]

25X1

25X1

18 Feb 65

7

*Honduras: Reaction to blatant manipulation of votes in the 16 February Honduran constituent assembly election may lead to civil disturbances and violence. At an early stage in the counting the Lopez government suspended the running announcement of results of the balloting because it showed the traditionally minority Nationalists on the way to an obviously inflated victory. Official returns announced considerably later gave the Nationalists 35 seats to 29 for the opposition Liberals. Although the elections were apparently free of official interference in the larger cities, there are strong indications that intimidation and fraud were widely used in outlying areas.

25X1
25X1

18 Feb 65

8

THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/08/19 : CIA-RDP80-00975A008100450001-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2002/08/19 : CIA-RDP80-00975A008100450001-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

STAT

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008100450001-2

Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008100450001-2